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right of trial by jury as enjoyed at
common law, but also may be unconstitutional.
defendant was found guilty of larIt is generally conceded in Illiceny in stealing an automobile, and nois that "trial by jury" relates to
was sentenced to the penitentiary. the practice in vogue under the
A writ of error was sworn out to common law: People v. Bruner
reverse the judgment on the grounds (1931) 343 Ill.146, 175 N. E. 400;
that the trial judge, in his charge Sinopoli v. Chicago Ry. Co. (1925)
to the jury, commented upon the 316 Il1.609, 147 N. E. 487. The
evidence and orally instructed the State Constitution provides that the
jury as to the law in the case. Held: right of trial by jury as heretofore
on appeal, that these acts of the enjoyed shall remain inviolate, and
judge were prohibited by the Prac- the constitutions of 1818 and 1848
tice Act: Ill. Rev. Stat. (Cahill, import the same meaning in similar
1931) ch. 110, secs. 72, 73. Judg- language: Ill. Const. 1870, Art. 2,
men4 reversed: People v. Kelly sec. 5; 1818, Art. 8, sec. 6; 1848,
(1931) 347 Ill. 221, 179 N. E. 898. Art. 13. The Supreme Court of
(Rehearing denied Feb. 3, 1932.)
Illinois held that the right of trial
The decision of the lower court by jury is the right as it existed
was reversed on the theory that at common law and at the time of
the judge had violated provisions the adoption of the respective conin the Practice Act which state stitutions: Liska v. Chicago, Ry.
that the court in charging the jury Co. (1925) 318 111.
570, 147 N. E.
shall only instruct as to the law 487.
of the case, and that such instrucAt common law it was the duty
tions shall be reduced to writing: of the judge to sum up the evidence
Ill. Rev. Stat. (Cahill, 1931), ch. on both sides of a case, assist the
110, secs. 72, 73. These enactments jury by commenting upon the eviwere held to be constitutional and dence in their presence, with the
not to infringe upon the right of reservation that the ultimate detertrial by jury as enjoyed at com- mination of the issue wofld f6e left
mon law. It is submitted, however, with the jurors: 3 Blackstone
that these provisions, which forbid "Commentaries on the Laws of Engthe judge to express his opinion on land" (Cooley Ed. 1884) 373, 374;
the evidence and require written in- 2 Hale "The History of the Com"structions to be given to the jury, mon Law" (Runnington Ed. 1794)
may not only encroach upon the 147; Scott "Trial by Jury and the
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - EVIDENCE
-POWER
OF JUDGE TO COMMENT
UPON EVIDENCE. - [Illinois]
The
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Reform of Civil Procedure" (1918)
court in holding that the constitu13 Harv. L. Rev. 669; Solarte v. tional provision retains the "subMelville (1827) 7 B. & C. 430, 1 stance" and not the particular methM. & R. 198 Lincoln v. Power od and procedure known to the
(1893) 151 U. S. 436, 14 Sup. Ct. common law trial by jury. The
387. In the United States, the
suggested construction of the comfirst deviation from the common mon law practice is supported by
law rule occurred in North Caro- decisions in several jurisdictions,
lina in 1796 when a statute was where, incidentally, the constitutional
passed forbidding the judge to com- provisions pertaining to trial by
ment upon the evidence in a trial. jury are similar to those in Illinois:
In other states statutes were en- New Jersey Const. 1844, Art. 1,
acted, constitutions were amended, sec. 7; Merklinger v. Lambert
or the courts rendered judicial de(1909) 76 N. J. L. 806, 72 Atl. 119;
cisions prohibiting the judge to ex- New York Const. 1894, Art. 7, sec.
ecute this common law duty: John- 2; Hurlburt v. Hurlburt (1891) 128
son "Province of the judge in Jury N. Y. 420, 28 N. E. 651.
Trials" (1928) 12 Jour. of Am. Jud.
The sections of the Illinois PracSoc. 76; for history of jury devel- tice Act, on which the court relies
opment, see Sunderland "The In- in rendering the decision in the
efficiency of the American Jury" instant case, encroach upon the
(1915) 13 Mich. L. Rev. 307; For- fundamental principle of the divisyth "History of Trial by Jury" sion of the powers of government
(1876). The common law practice into legislative, executive and judiwas abrogated in many cases be- cial departments: Ill. Const., 1870,
cause of the acts of one or several Art. 3. The legislature, in decreejudges, or because of enmity be- ing that the judge shall not comtween.the legislature and the bench:
ment upon the evidence in a trial
Jolpnson- "Province of the Judge in
and that his instructions shall be
Jury Trials" supra; for Illinois
in writing, is clearly transgresshistorical sketch see Cartwright ing the domain of the judiciary.
"Present But Taking No Part" The General Assembly is forbidden
(1916) 10 Ill. L. Rev. 537.
to pass local or special laws reguIn the instant case, the court ad- lating the practice in courts of jusmits that the essential requirements
tice: Ill. Const., 1870, Art. 4, sec.
of the right of trial by jury are 22. If any implication of legisla(1) twelve (2) impartial (3) quali- tive power to enact such statutes
fied jurors, who should (4) unani- is to be found in this provision, it
mously decide the facts in contro- is covered by the article which
versy; (5) under the direction and states that either department is forsuperintendence of a judge. At bidden to exercise any other decommon law, "under the direction partment's powers except as "hereand superintendence of a judge"
inafter expressly directed and perincluded his duty to give the jurors mitted": Ill. Const., 1870, Art. 3.
assistance by weighing the evidence
It is axiomatic, that the courts canbefore them: 2 Hale "History of
not dictate to the legislature what
the Common Law," supra, It seems
methods of practice or procedure it
that this construction of the com- must follow; and yet we have the
mon law practice is more tenable anomalous situation where the highthan the theory employed by the est tribunal of the state sanctions
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legislative dictation of court practices. The legislature exceeds its
constitutional power when it attempts to impose upon the judiciary
any rules for the dispatch of the
judiciary's duties: Wigmore "All
Legislative Rules for Judiciary
Procedure Are Void Constitutionally" (1928) 23 Ill. L. Rev. 276.
The principle enunciated in this
case may be questioned on the
ground that it retards the efficient
administration of justice. The reported experience of many trial
lawyers fortifies the theory that the
return to the orthodox common law
rule would aid greatly in the dispensation of justice. To permit
the presiding judge to express his
opinion concerning the weight of
the evidence would make of him
more than an umpire and constitutional arbiter while on the bench.
Less time and a minimum of expense would be required in impanelling a jury: "The Law of
Evidence" (Committee, Commonwealth Fund, 1927) 21. The introduction of evidence would be facilitated. The judge would be able to
exercise much more effective control over the conduct of the trial.
It would simplify the task of instructing the jury on the law. Few
reforms would have so wide reaching and wholesome effect in promoting efficiency of courts and improving the quality of justice obtainable there, as a return to the
common law rule of permitting the
judge to comment on and weigh
the evidence, and to instruct the
jury orally on points of law when
necessary. Sunderland "The Inefficiency of the American Jury,"

supra.
ROGER R. CLousE.
VERDICT-CoERCION BY JUDGE.[Ohio] The defendant was prose-

cuted for presenting false vouchers
to county officials, the trial extending over a period of two weeks. The
jury had been considering the case
for more than twenty-four hours
when it was brought back into open
court by the order of the judge
and was instructed as follows: "It
seems to me that the failure of this
jury to agree upon verdicts in this
case must be due to the fact that
some of you are permitting yourselves to be influenced by matters
extraneous to and outside of the
evidence of the case. The trial of
this case has been lengthy and a
very expensive thing to this community and no member of this panel
should refuse to join with his fellow jurors in a verdict on each of
these indictments for any trivial or
personal reason or consideration
not arising from the evidence or
the lack of evidence in the case.
You have heard all the testimony
and examined all the exhibits in
the case, and under the instructions
I have given you as to the law applicable herein you either are or
are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of the
charges made in these indictments.
Whichever is the fact you should
say so. You are all members of
the regular jury panel of this court,
and if you are unable to agree in
this case after all the consideration
of it you would be unable to agree
in any case and your further service as members of this panel would
not only be useless but a waste of
time and money to the litigants and
the citizens of this community. I
am now sending you out again for
the further consideration of the
case and I feel certain if you confine yourselves to the evidence and
the law as I have given it to you
you will have no difficulty in agreeing upon verdictd as to each of
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these indictments." The defendant
was found guilty, and he appealed,
claiming that he was deprived of
an impartial jury trial by reason of
this instruction. Held: that the
judgment be reversed and the case
remanded, on the ground that the
charge given by the trial court
coerced the jury to return this verdict: Zimmerman v. State (Ohio
1932) 182 N. E. 354.
The reviewing court, it must be
remembered, basing its decision on
the record, has no means of knowing the manner in which the instructions were given in the lower
court. Thus instructions apparently
coercive according to their written
content actually may be mild and
iiieffective. On the other hand, instructions which appear merely suggestive and advisory and in no way
forceful, may be coercive when
articulated by the judge.
One
writer tells of a distinguished member of the bench whose custom it
had been to deliver instructions so
drastic in nature that a defendant
rarely escaped conviction, and yet
the cases were never reversed. The
record would show that the judge
had charged: "If [scornfully] you
believe the defendant's testimony
you will of course acquit him. He
is presumed [with a shrug of the
shoulders] to be innocent until the
contrary is. proved. If you have
[another shrug] any reasonable
doubt as to his guilt, you must give
him the benefit of it. On the other
hand, if you accept the testimony
offered in behalf of the People, you
may and WILL Convict him!"

(The

last few words in tones of thunder.)
Train "Prisoner at the Bar" (1908)
p. 179.
In the early days coercion of verdicts was not an unusual occurrence and it generally has become
the practice in this country that

the court may properly admonish
the jury as to the importance of
coming to a verdict, but care should
be taken not to suggest what verdict is proper, nor to give instructions having a tendency to coerce
the jury into agreeing'on a verdict:
People v. Becker (1915) 215 N. Y.
126, 109 N. E. 127; Spick v. State
(1909) 140 Wis. 104, 121 N. W.
664. Where the facts show a clear
case of coercion, the courts have
not hesitated to reverse and remand
the cause: Quong Duck v. U. S.
(C. C. A. 9th, 1923) 293 Fed. 563
(where the judge instructed the
jury that he could not understand
why verdict was not promptly rendered and that in his opinion the
case was one where a verdict ought
to be reached) ; Kendrick v. State
(1930) 180 Ark. 1160, 24 S. W.
(2d) 859 ("I held one jury one
time here for six days and they
agrecd. I have never started out
with a jury that they didn't
agree.") ; Palmer v. State (1873)
50 Ala. 154 (The judge told the,
jury that he would keep the court
open until they did agree; that they
had nothing to do but to find defendant guilty.)
It may be clear in other instances
that there has been no coercion to
any degree, but merely an admonition as to the importance of coming
to a verdict: Israel v. U. S. (C.
C. A. 6th, 1925) 3 F. (2d) 743.
(Although the court expressed regret because of the jury's inability
to reach a verdict, he hoped that
they might be able to reconcile their
individual views, but never desired
to coerce any juror to decide against
his own conscience) ; People v. Quon
Foi (Cal. App. 1922) 206 Pac. 1028.
("Your exclusive province is to
judge the facts, but I wish to impress the advisability of coming to
your conclusion, and rendering a
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verdict. I sincerely trust that with
further consideration of this case,
you will be able to agree upon some
form of verdict.")
Somewhere between these two extremes cases arise in which a reasonable person may differ in deciding whether there has or has not
been coercion in the particular
case: Stewart v. U. S. (C. C. A.
8th, 1924) 300 Fed. 769. (Instruction to jury that the court desired
in no wise to influence them at all
in respect to a verdict but simply
to emphasize the fact that if they
can consistently, and by consultation with each other reach a verdict, and if a verdict can be conscientiously arrived at, it is highly
desirable-held erroneous); Conmonwealth v. Tenbroeck (1919)
265 Pa. St. 251, 108 Atl. 635. ("You
must agree. It is your duty to
undertake to agree"-held proper);
Yancy v. State (Ga. 1931) 160 S.
E. 867. ("Mistrials are a serious
matter and in many ways hinder
justice"--held proper.)
Only one case has been found
which disposes of a situation substantially the same as that in the
principal cape, and it was there
held erroneous to threaten to discharge the jury for failure to agree
on a verdict: People v. Strzempkowski (1920) 211 Mich. 266, 178
N. W. 771.
It has been said that the trial
judge possesses very broad discretion and that it needs a "pretty
plain case of prejulicial overstep-

ping of it" to constitute error:
Willard v. State (1928) 195 Wis.
170, 217 N. W. 651. The view also
has been advanced, that "it would
be startling to have such action held
to be error, and error sufficient to
reverse a judgment": Allis v. U. S.
(1894) 155 U. S. 117, 15 Sup. Ct.
36. Some courts, however, have

expressly stated that "whether the
error is harmless or prejudicial depends on the facts of the case":
People v. Volub (1929) 333 Ill. 554,
165 N. E. 196. Although this latter
proposition has not been stated
openly by the authorities in this
particular branch, except in a few
instances, it seems to provide a
convenient means by which a case
may be reversed and remanded, and
it leaves the way open for reviewing courts to decide the question
either way depending upon their
version of the particular facts.
EDwARD

CRIMINAL

S.

ALTERSOHN.

PROCEDURE -

STATE'S

RIGHT TO APPEAL WHEN AN INDICTMENT IS QUASHED.-[Illinois]
The ,defendant was indicted for
bigamy in the Criminal Court of
Cook County.
The trial judge
quashed the indictment because it
failed to describe the parties or subject matter with sufficient certainty.
The state sued out a writ of error
to test the constitutionality of an
Illinois statute enacted in 1845
which prohibited the state from
appealing or applying for a writ of
error or new trial in a criminal
case: Il. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd,
1931) ch. 38, sec. 747. Held: writ
of error dismissed: People v. Barber
(1932) 348 Ill. 40, 180 N. E. 633.
After upholding the constitutionality of the statute involved and
arriving at the inescapable conclusion that the state had nq right to
appeal because of its existence, the
court stated that any departure
from the present law must be legislative and not judicial.
The question whether or not a
state may appeal in a criminal case
has been answered in a variety of
ways, covering practically every
possibility between the two ex-

1040
tremes." At common law, the state
could not appeal or sue out a writ
of error to review a judgment for
the defendant in a criminal case,
even on demurrer, much less on a
verdict of acquittal: Clark "Criminal Procedure" (1895) 393. A
few jurisdictions, by judicial decision, forbid appeals by the state
in all cases: State v. Johnson
(1920) 146 Minn. 468, 177 N. W.
657; Comm. v. Cummungs (Mass.
1849) 3 Cush. 212. In some instances, courts have declined to considtr points raised by the state on
appeal taken by defendants: Prescott v. State (1907) 52 Tex. Cr.
App. 35, 105 S. W. 192; Parks v.
State (1917) 21 Ga. App. 506, 94
S. E. 628. A few states permit appeals by the prosecution only in
cases of major offenses: State v.
Adams (1920) 142 Ark. 411, 218
S. W. 845. Others allow it only in
cases of minor offenses: Comm. v.
Gritten (1918) 180 Ky. 446, 202
S. W. 884. Some jurisdictions, even
in the absence of statutes, allow
the state to appeal from a judgment
in favor of the defendant if it
was rendered prior to verdict: State
v. Buchanan (Md. 1821) 5 Harr. &
J. 317; Comm. v. Capp. (1864) 48
Pa. St. 53. Connecticut adopts the
view that jeopardy is a continuing
one from the beginning to the end
of the cause, and under a statute
giving the state the same right as
the accused to appeal on all questions of law arising in a criminal
case has held that even after an
acquittal the state may appeal, or
in case of a reversal may bring the
defendant into court again for a
new trial: Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918)
sec. 6648; State v. Lee (1894) 65
Conn. 265, 30 Atd. 1110.
Jurisdictions which permit an appeal by -the state vary as to when
this right shall be exercised. The
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Federal Criminal Appeals Act permits the government to appeal Dy
means of a writ of error from a
decision or judgment quashing, setting aside or sustaining a demurrer
to any indictment where such decision or judgment is based upon
the invalidity o4 construction of
the statute upon which the indictment is founded: (1907) 34 Stat.
1246, 18 U. S. C. A. 682. In
twenty-three jurisdictions the state
is authorized by statute to appeal
from an order setting aside or sustaining a demurrer to an indictment; some like Michigan, on the
same grounds as the Federal Act,
and others on more liberal grounds:
Am. L. Inst. Proposed Final Draft
of Code of Cr. Proc. (1930) 499.
This Federal practice, and tne
tendency of almost haif of the
states to allow on appeal by the
state upon the quashing of an indictment, shows the need of modernizing the criminal procedure in
Illinois to the extent of permitting
the state to appeal upon the quashing of an indictment when jeopardy
has not attached to the defendant,
when the statute on which the indictment is founded has been declared unconstitutional or because
of a formal defect in the indictment itself. The practical desirability of this reform already has
been realized: Am. L. Inst. Proposed Final Draft of Code of Cr.
Pro., supra, sec. 440, p. 148.
A defendant is not put in jeopardy
by the mere reading of an indictment, as jeopardy attaches only
when the accused has been arraigned and the jury sworn and
impaneled: People v. O'Donnel
(1906) 224 Ill. 218, 79 N. E. 639.
Moreover, a nolle prosequi before
trial has commenced does not preclude another indictment for the
same offense: Ibid. It would seem,
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then, that there is no good reasor
an appeal, an erroneous decision
why the state should not be per- may be corrected without in any
mitted to appeal from a trial court way infringing on the rights of the
decision quashing an indictment.
defendant. To anticipate the obAnother argument in support of
jection that the state may by proremoving this restraint upon the longing the appeal deny the deprosecution may be found in the fendant a speedy and public trial
words of Chief Justice Taft in his guaranteed by the Constitution, the
comment upon the Federal Criminal state could be made subject to the
Appeals Act of 1907: "The reason
usual time limits governing.any apand policy of this statute is in the peal in criminal cases.
need for expedition in securing a
It is hoped that the legislature
final interpretation of new criminal will realize that the present statute
statutes by the court of last resort, has outlived its usefulness, and will
so that the government and those bring Illinois into accord with the
charged with violating the new law more progressive states, by amendmay have the earliest possible final ing the present statute or enacting
interpretation of what the new law another allowing the state to apmeans, and long trials and convic- peal upon the quashing of an intions, which might subsequently be dictment when jeopardy' has not
set aside because of a faulty inter- begun, and thus secure this much
pretation of the statute, may be needed modernization in the adminavoided. Expedition and uniform- istration of criminal justice.
ity in construction are thus the conALFRED J. CILELLA.
trolling considerations." Taft "The
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
Under the Act of Feb. 13, 1925."
ACCESSORIES AFTER THE FACT(1925) 35 Yale L. J. 1. This rea- PROSECUTION AFTER ACQUITTAL OF
soning is equally applicable to a ALLEGED PRINcIPAL.-[Kentucky] A
statute allowing the state to appeal Kentucky statute provided that "acupon the quashing of an indict- cessories after the fact, not otherment.
wise punished, shall be guilty of
Where an indictment is quashed high misdemeanors-and may be
upon the ground that the statute tried, though the principals be not
upon which it is founded is uncon- taken or tried": Carroll's Ky. Statstitutional and void, there is no utes (1922) ch. 36, sec. 1129. The
way under the existing law by Kentucky court in the instant case
which the case can be appealed to held that the prior acquittal of the
the highest! tribunal of the state alleged principal did not preclude
for a final decision upon its con- the prosecution of a defendant as
stitutionality and, thus, whether the an accessory after the fact. Altrial court is right or wrong its de- though it is necessary in such a
cisions become final: Comment prosecution to prove the guilt of
(1927) 3 Notre Dame Lawyer 45. the principal, the prior acquittal of
Though the rights of an accused the alleged principal is not res
must be safeguarded religiously, yet judicata as to his innocence in the
the legislature has a right, and not subsequent prosecution of an aconly a right, but a duty to look to cessory after the fact. This rethe interest of the great body of
sults from the established rule that
people. Thus by allowing the state the prior conviction of the prin-
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cipal does not preclude an alleged
accessory after the fact from-show:ing in a subsequent prosecution that
he is innocent: Kentucky v. Long
(Jan. 24, 1933, Kentucky Court of
Appeals) United States Daily, Feb.
9, 1933, p. 4.
The court in the instant case departed from the common law. At
common law, an accessory, either
before or after the fact, could not
be convicted unless his. principal
had been convicted, or outlawed,
which was the, equivalent of conviction. -The one exception was
where the accessory consented to
be tried before the principal.
Therefore, the conviction of the
principal was one of the essential
elements in the trial of the accessory. If both were tried together,
this remained true, for then the
jury were required,- first, to determine the guilt of the principal,
and only upon so finding could they
consider the guilt of the accessory:
People v. Beintner (1918) 168 N.
Y. Supp. 945; 1 Brill "Cyclopedia
of Criminal Law" (1922) sec. 254.
In some states, where by statutory provision those aiding and
abetting the performance of a
felony, or accessories before tne
fact, are made principals and may
be tried and convicted prior to the
trial and conviction of the principal, it is held, nevertheless, that
a subsequent acquittal of the principal will entitle the accessory to a
discharge: McCarty v. State (1873)
44 Ind. 214; State v. Jones (1888)
101 N. C. 719, 8 S. E. -147; Bowen
v. State (1889) 25 Fla. 645, 6 So.
459; for further discussion of the
effect of such statutory provisions
and a similar holding in Illinois as
to accessories before the fact, see
comment (1932) 24 JOURNAL OF
CRIMINAi

107.

LAW

AND

CRIMINOLOGY

However, in other jurisdic-

tions, under similar statutory provisions, the acquittal oJf the principal defendant does not operate to
discharge the prior conviction of
the accessory nor to bar his subsequent prosecution and conviction:
State v. Patterson (1893) 52 Kan.
335, 34 Pac. 784; Cummings v.
Commonwealth (1927) 221 Ky. 301,
298 S. W. 943; Rooney v. United
States (C. C. A. 9th, 1913) 203 Fed.
928; but cf. United States v. Crane
(C. C. Ohio, 1847) 4 McLean 317,
Fed. Cas. 14,888. The same result
logically is reached where the statute expressly provides that the acquittal of the principal shall not bar
a prosecution against an accessory:
Gibson v. State (1908) 53 Tex.
Cr. 349, 110 S. W. 41. For further
discussion and authorities, see Sears
"Principals and Accessories" (1931)
25 Ill. Law Rev. 845.
Accessories after the fact often
are dealt with separately, by the
statutes, but where it is held that
accessories before the fact, who
frequently are considered as principals, can or cannot be prosecuted
and convicted if the principal defendant is acquitted the rule should
be the same for accessories after
the fact. At least, there do not
appear to be any cases to the contrary. In the instant case, the Kentucky statute permitted the trial of
accessories after the fact, though
the principal had not been taken or
tried. In other states, under statutes which went farther by permitting the trial and conviction of an
accessory after the fact, whether
the principal had or had not been
convicted, and although he had been
pardoned or otherwise discharged
from conviction, it was 'held that
the acquittal of the principal did
not bar the conviction of an accessory after the fact: People v. Beint-
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ner, supra; State v. Jones (1909)
91 Ark. 5, 120 S. W. 154.
The Kentucky court in the instant case adhered to the common
law requirement of the proof of
the guilt of the principal in the
prosecution of the accessory. It is
generally held that the guilt of the
principal must be shown: 1 Brill
"Cyclopedia of Criminal Law"
(1922) sec. 253; Ray v. State
(1912) 102 Ark. 594, 145 S. W.
RR1: Pon te v. Jordan (1910) 244
Ill. 386, 91 N. E. 482; Rawlins v.
State (1905) 124 Ga. 31, 52 S. E.
1. This is true where the statute
allows the accessory to be tried before the conviction of the principal:
McMahon v. State (1910) 168 Ala.
70, 53 So. 89; Gibson v. State, supra.
The acquittal of the principal, however, was held by the instant case
not to be res judicata as to his innocence in the subsequent prosecution of an accessory after the fact.
The authorities in this country seem
to be divided on the question of
the conclusiveness of the judgment
as to the principal defendant in the
trial of the accessory. Some courts
hold that a judgment of acquittal
as to the principal is conclusive
proof on the trial of the accessory
that the alleged principal did not
commit the crime charged: Ray v.
State (1882) 13 Neb. 55, 13 N. W.
2; State v. Haines (1899) 51 La.
Ann. 731, 25 So. 372. Another view
is that the judgment as to the principal is prima facie proof, but is
not conclusive evidence of his guilt:
Commonwealth v. Minnich (1915)
250 Pa. 363, 95 Atl. 565. A third
holding, where the conviction or
acquittal of the principal is immaterial to the prosecuion and conviction of the accessory, is that
neither judgment is admissible in
the action against the accessory:
People v. Beintner, supra; State v.

Gargano (1923) 99 Conn. 103, 121
Atl. 657.
It is submitted that the instant
case may be indicative of a trend
toward a more complete and facile
administration of the criminal laws.
It is logically correct, perhaps, that
in order for one to be guilty as an
accessory after the fact there mus,
be a guilty principal. Tne prosecution of one as an accessory
though the alleged principal was acquitted does not, it seems, necessarily militate against this. An acquittal might not result from absence of guilt since it is but the
verdict of one body of triers, and
may have been wrongfully obtained.
When the guilt of the principal is
shown upon the trial of the*accessory, it appears that the logical requirement' is satisfied. The common law affords a guilty accessory
the opportunity to thwart justice
should his equally guilty principal
evade conviction.
ROLAND

CONDUCT

OF

W.

SPANGENDiERG.

JUDGE -EXAMINA-

TION OF WITNESSES.-[Illinois]

The

defendants were convicted of robbery, after having waived trial by
jury. Upon appeal the defendants
alleged misconduct of the trial
judge as ground for reversal. It
was charged that the judge propounded more questions to the defendant's alibi witnesses than did
the counsel for defense and prosecution combined. It was urged
further that the judge subjected the
witnesses to a severe cross-examination and showed hostility toward
them. Held: affirmed. The extent to which a judge may indulge
in the examination of witnesses
rests largely within his discretion,
although in the exercise of such
discretion he must not forget the
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function of judge and assume that
of advocate. In this case the testimony of the witnesses was patently
fabricated so that the judge had a
right to act as he did: People v.
Giacomino (1932) 347 Ill. 601, 180
N. E. 437.
The attitude of the American
courts toward freedom of the judge
in examining and cross-examining
witnesses finds its source deep
rooted in the English law. In the
time of Bracton, when the jurors
themselves were witnesses, the
judge exercised considerable control over them: Stephen "General
View of the Criminal Law of England" (1863) 18. Bracton reported
that where a serious crime was involved, and the jurors wished to
conceal it, the judge could separate
them and examine each one individually so as to ascertain the truth
sufficiently: Bracton "De Legibus et
Consuetudinibus Angliae," Book 5,
Vol. 2 of 1879 reprint, ch. 22, sec.
3.
Lord Chief Justice Ellenborough once remarked that to say the
judge on the bench may not put
what questions and in what form he
pleases can only originate in that
dullness and stupidity which is the
curse of the age: 25 Hansard Parl.
Deb. (1813) 207 1 Wigmore "Evidence" (1904) sec. 784; 1 Chainberlayn "Modern Law of Evidence"
(1911) sec. 539. Today in England the judge of his own volition
may put on the stand and examine
witnesses wilo are called neither
by the prosecution nor by the defense. In order to clear up doubtful points the judge often interrogates witnesses during their examination by counsel, and he unceremoniously terminates any attempt on either side to substitute
confusion for common sense: Howard "Criminal Justice in England"
(1931) 376.

In sharp contrast is the attitude
of appellate courts in the United
States, which fear that any intercession by the judge will influence
a jury. The general rule is that a
trial judge has an undoubted right
to interrogate witnesses for the
purpose of developing the truth of
the matter at issue, and he likewise
has a discretion to determine when
a necessity or propriety therefor
exists. However this undoubted
right and this discretion are construed quite strictly according to
the circumstances of each case:
Andrews v. Ketcham (1875) 77 Ill.
377, Sparks v. State (1877) 59
Ala. 82; Long v. State (1884) 95
Ind. 481; Gordon v. Irvine (1897)
105 Ga. 144, 31 S. E. 151; Jones
"Evidence" (1914)
see. 815; 1
Wharton "Criminal Evidence" (10th
ed. 1912) sec. 452; 1 Wigmore
"Evidence" (1904)
sec. 784; 8
Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice secs. 71-73; Bowers "Judicial
Discretion of Trial Courts" (1931)
sec. 399.
In Illinois it always has been
recognized that the judge has freedom in examination within the
bounds of his own discretion:
Foreman v. Baldwin (1860) 24 Ili.
299; Dunn v. People (1898) 172 Ill.
582, 50 N. E. 137; People v. Schultz
(1921) 301 Ill. 601, 133 N. E. 379;
People v. Rongetti (1928) 331 Ill.
581, 596, 163 N. E. 373. In each
of these cases it is to be noted that
the effect on the jury is the deciding factor which limits the discretion of the judge. Even the tone
or inflection of the voice of the
judge will indicate his opinion of
innocence or guilt of the defendants, and for that reason it is felt
that instances are rare and conditions exceptional which will justify
the presiding judge in entering
upon and conducting such an ex-
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amination. The exercise of a sound
discretion will seldom deem such
action necessary or advisable: Dunn
v. People, supra.; People v. Rongetti, supra; People V. Bernstein
(1911) 250 11. 63, 95 N. E. 50.
In deciding the instant case, which
was a trial by a judge alone, the
court cited only one authority on
the subject at issue, and that was
a case of trial by jury: People v.
Bernstein, supra. The court passed
over the distinction by saying that
the principle in the two cases is
the same. In view of the fact that
the presence of the jury has been
the predominating factor and has
had such a pronounced effect in
moulding and constricting the freedom of the judge and his discretion, it is most difficult to see how

the absence of the jury leaves the
situation unaffected, or the application of the rule unchanged. While
the court is consistent with principle in upholding the judge iht the
instant case, the practice of applying a rule which grew up with jury
trial to a case in which the jury
is waived hardly seems logical.
The chief cause for restriction is
gone. With waiver of juries increasing, and the resultant weight
of responsibility thrown upon the
judge, it seems desirable to approach more closely the .nglish
practice in regard to judicial freedom, and to expand proportionately the previously strict construction of such discretion.
M. M.
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